Skip Navigation



RFS Advance Access published online on June 21, 2008

Review of Financial Studies, doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn068
This Article
Right arrow Full Text
Right arrow Advance Access manuscript (PDF)
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Rauh, J. D.
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

© The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org.

Risk Shifting versus Risk Management: Investment Policy in Corporate Pension Plans

Joshua D. Rauh
University of Chicago Graduate School of Business

Address correspondence to Joshua D. Rauh, University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, 5807 South Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637; telephone: 773-834-1710; fax: 773-702-0458; e-mail: jrauh{at}ChicagoGSB.edu.

JEL Classification: G32, G11, G23


   Abstract

The asset allocation of defined benefit pension plans is a setting where both risk-shifting and risk-management incentives are likely be present. Empirically, firms with poorly funded pension plans and weak credit ratings allocate a greater share of pension fund assets to safer securities such as government debt and cash, whereas firms with well-funded pension plans and strong credit ratings invest more heavily in equity. These relations hold both in pooled regressions and within firms and plans over time. The incentive to limit costly financial distress plays a considerably larger role than risk shifting in explaining variation in pension fund investment policy among firms in the United States.


I thank James Wang and Michael Wong for excellent research assistance. I am grateful to John Birge, Patrick Bolton, John Campbell, Murillo Campello, Chris Crevier, Mike Faulkender, Sean Finucane, Charles Hadlock, Dirk Jenter, Steve Kaplan, Vicky Kiosse, Gordon Latter, Deborah Lucas, Francisco Perez-Gonzalez, Mitchell Petersen, James Poterba, Michael Roberts, Antoinette Schoar, Berk Sensoy, Morten Sørensen, Per Strömberg, Amir Sufi, Michael Weisbach, Steve Zeldes, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants at MIT Sloan, the 2006 Corporate Finance Conference at the Washington University Olin School of Business, the 2006 NBER Corporate Finance Summer Institute, and the 2006 UBS Pensions Research Programme Conference at the London School of Economics for helpful comments and discussions. I also thank seminar participants at the Chicago GSB finance faculty lunch, the European Central Bank, the University of Illinois, and Michigan State University for comments on an earlier version of this work entitled "Who Manages Pension Fund Risk?"


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?




Disclaimer:
Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.