Skip Navigation



RFS Advance Access published online on May 21, 2008

Review of Financial Studies, doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn051
This Article
Right arrow Full Text
Right arrow Advance Access manuscript (PDF)
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Park, K.
Right arrow Articles by Pennacchi, G.
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

© The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org.

Harming Depositors and Helping Borrowers: The Disparate Impact of Bank Consolidation

Kwangwoo Park
Graduate School of Finance, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology

George Pennacchi
Department of Finance, College of Business, University of Illinois

Address correspondence to George Pennacchi, Department of Finance, College of Business, University of Illinois, 1206 South Sixth Street, Champaign, IL 61820; telephone: (217)-244-0952; e-mail: gpennacc{at}uiuc.edu.

JEL Classification: G21, G28, G34, L11


   Abstract

A model of multimarket spatial competition is developed where small, single-market banks compete with large, multimarket banks (LMBs) for retail loans and deposits. Consistent with empirical evidence, LMBs are assumed to set retail interest rates uniformly across markets, have different operating costs, and have access to wholesale funding. If LMBs have significant funding advantages that offset potential loan operating cost disadvantages, then market-extension mergers by LMBs promote loan competition, especially in concentrated markets. However, such mergers reduce retail deposit competition, especially in less concentrated markets. Prior empirical research and our own analysis of retail deposit rates support the model's predictions.


We are grateful to the Office for Banking Research at the University of Illinois and the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland for research support. Dong Keun Choi and Jaehoon Lee provided excellent research assistance. Valuable comments were provided by Allen Berger, Mark Carey, Nicola Cetorelli, Astrid Dick, Joong Ho Han, Timothy Hannan, Robert Hauswald, Myron Kwast, Sangwoo Lee, Toby Moskowitz (the editor), Robin Prager, Bent Vale, two anonymous referees, and participants of the 2003 Competition in Banking Markets Conference at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, the 2004 International Industrial Organization Conference, the 2004 Chicago Fed Bank Structure and Competition Conference, and the 2005 American Finance Association Meetings. We also thank participants of seminars at the University of Alberta, the Bank of Korea, Hitotsubashi University, KAIST, the Korea Institute of Finance, Korea University, the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation, Seoul National University, and Waseda University.


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?




Disclaimer:
Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.