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Rev Fin 2002; 15:615-648
© 2002 the Society for Financial Studies
Sidelined Investors, Trading-Generated News, and Security Returns
University of North Carolina
Harvard University
Ohio State University
Abstract
This article studies information blockages and the asymmetric release of information in a security market with fixed setup costs of trading. In this setting, "sidelined" investors may delay trading until price movements validate their private signals. Trading thereby internally generates the arrival of further news to the market. This leads to (1) negative skewness following price run-ups and positive skewness following price rundowns (even though the model is ex ante symmetric), (2) a lack of correspondence between large price changes and the arrival of external information, and (3) increases in volatility following large price changes.
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